So far, we’ve seen how BRRRR can outperform both flipping and traditional buy-and-hold by recycling capital. But the whole strategy hinges on what can be the hardest R in BRRRR: the Refinance. Without the ability to pull cash back out of each deal, BRRRR stops after one or two properties. That makes financing not just a technical detail, but the defining factor in how fast, or whether, an investor can scale.
The reality is that refinancing is the bottleneck of the BRRRR method. Buying and renovating can often be done in months. Renting out can be handled quickly, especially in strong markets. But the refinance depends on lenders, and lenders impose seasoning periods, loan caps, and underwriting requirements that can either accelerate or choke an investor’s growth.
When David Greene popularized the term “BRRRR” in 2019 and formalized the strategy into the memorable: “Buy Rehab Rent Refinance Repeat” acronym, two full chapters were dedicated to refinancing strategy for budding BRRRR method investors. In 2025, although only a little more than half a decade later, the financing landscape for BRRRR strategy refinances is completely different as compared to what’s described in the now-outdated BRRRR “bible.”
When David Greene popularized the term “BRRRR” in 2019 and formalized the strategy into the memorable: “Buy Rehab Rent Refinance Repeat” acronym, two full chapters were dedicated to refinancing strategy for budding BRRRR method investors. In 2025, although only a little more than half a decade later, the financing landscape for BRRRR strategy refinances is completely different as compared to what’s described in the now-outdated BRRRR “bible.”
The book walked through a laundry list of options that investors could use for the refinance portion of BRRRR, covering conventional loans (Fannie Mae / Freddie Mac traditional options), what Greene referred to as “portfolio lenders” which included banks and credit unions (who kept the loans on their balance), “private money,” i.e. individuals or small groups that acted more like an investing partner than a fully-formed lending company and a range of creative or alternative strategies like exploring HELOCS, second liens, seller financing or other forms of credit.
In Greene’s book, conventional loans were positioned as the “bread and butter” of refinancing for BRRRR investors in 2019. The pros were obvious: lowest interest rates, 30-year fixed terms, and predictable underwriting guidelines that most investors were already familiar with. But the familiar cons included the same hurdles most landlords already knew well, only magnified when trying to build a BRRRR portfolio. Because qualification was based on personal income and debt-to-income (DTI) ratios, every new loan snowballed into a harder approval process. As properties were accumulated, mortgage payments stacked up faster than underwriters credited rental income, making each deal progressively more difficult to qualify for.
Even investors who could thread the needle and keep qualifying eventually hit the hard ceiling of 10 financed properties under Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac rules. That limit meant true scale, building dozens of BRRRR rentals into a large, cash-flowing portfolio, was simply not possible using conventional financing alone. The challenge was even more acute for self-employed investors or those without W-2 income. Greene pointed out the catch-22: to qualify for conventional loans, you often needed the stability of a full-time job and documented salary. But holding that job also limited your time and energy to aggressively pursue BRRRR projects. In other words, the very investors most motivated to build financial freedom through BRRRR were often the least able to qualify for the financing needed to execute the strategy at scale.
Portfolio Lenders (Local Banks and Credit Unions) were Greene’s second major option. These smaller banks kept the loans on their own books instead of selling them to Wall Street, which made them more flexible. Some would allow shorter seasoning times, count rental income more generously, or work with investors on custom terms. The downside was that these loans were often more expensive, frequently adjustable-rate rather than fixed, and heavily relationship-driven. Greene stressed that building a strong connection with a local banker could be a huge advantage, but it wasn’t a scalable solution, especially for investors that wanted to build national portfolios or do long-distance investing, rather than being constrained by their local area.
Private Money, or borrowing from individuals instead of institutions was cited as the most flexible option. The pros were obvious: fewer rules, negotiable terms and the ability to move quickly. Individuals lending “private money” could act more like partners, sharing in profits or offering more generous structures. But private money came with tradeoffs: it relied on trust, personal relationships and reputation. It is not a system that every investor can easily access or rely on consistently.
Finally, Greene described a toolbox of “creative” financing techniques investors could use to fill gaps. This included HELOCs (home equity lines of credit), second liens, seller financing, and even strategies like borrowing from retirement accounts or forming partnerships. These methods weren’t long-term refinancing solutions, but they could provide temporary capital to get a deal across the finish line. Greene presented them as potentially useful tools in the kit, but not reliable engines for scaling.
In summary, in 2019, the financing menu was workable but limited. Conventional loans offered cheap rates but had strict caps. Portfolio lenders provided flexibility but lacked scale. Private money could be powerful but was relationship-dependent. Creative strategies were useful one-offs, but not a foundation for building a large portfolio. Greene’s book showed that BRRRR could succeed within that framework, but the strategy still carried refinancing friction points that slowed growth compared to the exponential vision investors hoped for.
Also notably missing? Any discussion whatsoever of DSCR Loans, which to be fair, had just started to emerge as a financing option when the book was written. But it’s illustrative of just how much can change in a relatively short period of time when it comes to financing options for real estate investors. And it shows just how important it is to stay on top of what’s available and how each option works.
As DSCR Loans began to appear in the years after Greene’s book, they quickly became a favorite tool for BRRRR investors. The appeal was obvious: all the familiar hurdles that slowed conventional loans, tax return scrutiny, DTI calculations, and the 10-property cap, simply didn’t apply. Instead, each property was qualified on its own merits, based on whether the rent covered the mortgage payment. For BRRRR investors in particular, this was a game-changer, as speed and scale are the key motivators of BRRRR method investors.
The tradeoffs for DSCR Loans were minor. Rates were typically only about 1% higher than conventional loans, and in some cases equivalent or even lower, especially when paired with prepayment penalties. For most investors, that small cost was well worth the benefits. As long as the property qualified on its own and the borrower maintained solid credit, they could scale quickly to 20, 30, even 50+ properties in just a few years, something that was simply not possible with conventional or other financing options.
This flexibility made DSCR Loans particularly well-suited not only for full-time real estate investors, but also for people without traditional W-2 income. Realtors, entrepreneurs, 1099 contractors, and others who struggled with conventional DTI hurdles suddenly had a clear path to build large portfolios. By 2022, the BRRRR method had really taken off, and while many investors mixed and matched financing options, DSCR Loans had become the dominant choice for those scaling aggressively. Conventional loans remained popular for beginners under the 10-property cap, but for serious BRRRR investors, DSCR Loans were the engine of growth.
Just as DSCR Loans were hitting their stride, conventional financing became even less attractive for BRRRR investors. In early 2023, Fannie Mae rolled out a rule change called “Announcement SEL-2023-01” that required a full 12 months of ownership (seasoning) before allowing any cash-out refinance on an investment property.
This was a major shift. Before 2023, many investors could recycle their capital in as little as six months using conventional loans, not lightning fast, but fast enough to keep the BRRRR cycle moving. After the rule change, even the best-executed BRRRR deals were forced to sit in limbo for a year before investors could access their money. That meant every property tied up capital for twice as long, slowing portfolio growth to a crawl.
The impact was especially harsh for investors who had relied on conventional loans for their first few BRRRRs. For them, the change felt like hitting a wall. Instead of scaling at one or two properties per year, their pace slowed to one every year or longer, depending on how quickly they could save. For many, BRRRR stopped feeling like a repeatable wealth-building system and more like a waiting game.
Luckily for BRRRR strategy investors, DSCR Loans were there to save the day. While conventional remained the cheapest option on paper, the new seasoning rule meant it was no longer viable for anyone serious about scaling. By the end of 2023, the message was clear: if you wanted BRRRR to work at speed, DSCR wasn’t just the better option — it was the only option.
Up Next: We'll dive into every detail for why DSCR Loans are the top choice for BRRRR Refinances!
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